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HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES IN US PART 121 AIRLINE ACCICDENTS
Bryan Nuñez, Carlos López, Jonathan Velazquez, and Oswart A. Mora 
Inter American University of Puerto Rico 
Bayamón, Puerto Rico 
Kevin Román 
Delta Air Lines 
Atlanta, Georgia
The greater part of aviation accidents is often attributed to human error, 
with flight crew performance accounting for the majority of these mishaps. In 
2016, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published a rule to address pilot 
professionalism and to increase the likelihood that aviators adhere to standard 
procedures and prevent behavior that could lead to pilot errors in the airline 
domain. The FAA has identified 5 Hazardous Attitudes that afflict pilots: macho, 
impulsivity, resignation, invulnerability, and anti-authority. This study examined 
the FAA-defined Hazardous Attitudes and the regularity with which they occurred 
in the U.S. air carrier flight crew related accidents between 1991-2018. The top 
two Hazardous Attitudes were anti-authority and invulnerability, which were 
found in 92% and 68% of aviation accidents, respectively. The paper also 
explores the relationships among these Hazardous Attitudes and other 
contributing factors such as time of day, weather, flight conditions, and crew 
resource management, among others. 
Literature Review 
There are a multitude of factors that affect decision making and Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) within the cockpit. CRM is the proper use of all the available resources 
(human, hardware, and information) to conduct and complete a safe flight (FAA, 2004).  
Helmreich and Foushee found that the lack of CRM was responsible for more than 70% of the 
accidents during the period between 1959 and 1989 (1993). Furthermore, Wetmore and Lu 
studied general aviation (GA) accidents and found that Hazardous Attitudes have a great 
influence in the aeronautical decision making (ADM) process of pilots (Wetmore & Lu, 2005a, 
2005b, 2006; Wetmore, Bos, & Lu, 2007).
An attitude is a predisposition to respond to an event in a given manner (FAA, 2009). 
Investigations have identified five Hazardous Attitudes, which interfere with the ability to make 
decisions and exercise authority properly (FAA, 2009). These Hazardous Attitudes are macho, 
impulsivity, resignation, invulnerability, and anti-authority (Table 1). Although they contribute 
to poor pilot judgment, they can be counteracted by saying the correct antidote (FAA, 2009). 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was 
published in 2016, to tipoff pilots to follow standards procedures and professionalism and to 
prevent behavior, which could lead to errors (81 FR 69908-Pilot Professional Development, 
2016). Historically, most of the research on Hazardous Attitudes has focused on the GA 
population and the flight instruction environment (Hunter, Martinussen, Wiggins, and O’Hare 
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2011; Stewart, J. 2006, 2008; Wagener & Ison, 2014; Wetmore & Lu, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; 
Wetmore, Bos, & Lu, 2007). However, this study concentrated on the Hazardous Attitudes in the 
multi-crew environment and focuses on which ones were predominant in crew-related accidents. 
The specific research questions were: 
1. Which Hazardous Attitudes are present, and with what regularity do these 
occur, in flight crew related accidents?
2. What relationships exist between the pilot Hazardous Attitudes and other 
contributing factors in these U.S. airline accidents? 
Table 1. 
Hazardous Attitudes Definitions and Antidotes as defined by FAA (2009, p. 2-5) 
Hazardous Attitude Definition Antidote
Anti-Authority: This attitude is found in people who do not like “Follow the rules.
(AA) anyone telling them what to do. In a sense, they are They are usually
“Don’t tell me.” saying, "No one can tell me what to do." They may right.”
be resentful of having someone tell them what to 
do, or may regard rules, regulations, and procedures
as silly or unnecessary. However, it is always your
prerogative to question authority if you feel it is in 
error.
Impulsivity: This is the attitude of people who frequently feel “No so fast.
(IM) the need to do something, anything, immediately. Think first.”
“Do it quick.” They do not stop to think about what they are about
to do; they do not select the best alternative, and
they do the first thing that comes to mind.
Invulnerability: Many people feel that accidents happen to others, “It could happen
(IV) but never to them. They know accidents can to me.”
“It won’t happen to happen, and they know that anyone can be affected.
me. They never really feel or believe that they will be
personally involved. Pilots who think this way are
more likely to take chances and increase risk.
Macho: Pilots who are always trying to prove that they are “Taking chances
(MA) better than anyone else are thinking, "I can do it – is foolish.”
“I can do it. I'll show them." Pilots with this type of attitude will
try to prove themselves by taking risks in order to
impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a
male characteristic, women are equally susceptible.
Resignation: Pilots who think, "What's the use?" do not see “I’m not helpless.
(RE) themselves as being able to make a great deal of I can make a
“What’s the use?” difference in what happens to them. When things go difference.”
well, the pilot is apt to think that it is good luck.
When things go badly, the pilot may feel that
someone is out to get me, or attribute it to bad luck.
The pilot will leave the action to others, for better
or worse. Sometimes, such pilots will even go along 
with unreasonable requests just to be a "nice guy."
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Methodology 
The study used archival methods to explore the Hazardous Attitudes contributing to U.S. 
Part 121 flight crew accidents. The primary data source was the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University (ERAU) National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database blue cover accidents 
reports. Research focused on NTSB Accident Reports periodical, which cataloged 37 accidents 
from 1991 to 2018. Excluded were all accidents with undetermined causes or those attributed to 
terrorism. All 37 accidents, that fit the above-mentioned characteristics, were analyzed by 5 
subject matter experts (SMEs) so as to identify any Hazardous Attitudes and the contributing 
factors in the accidents. 
The research team analyzed the accident reports to determine the presence of Hazardous 
Attitudes that may have been influential. The researchers also identified contributing situational 
factors, such as weather, CRM, airline management, flight rules, etc., that may have exacerbated 
the effect of the Hazardous Attitude. A priori codes were used; specifically, the FAA-defined 
Hazardous Attitudes. After the identification process was completed, the SMEs tried to find any 
connections between the Hazardous Attitude and the other contributing factors. All the relevant 
information from the accident reports was entered into NVivo (v. 12), a computer aided 
qualitative data analysis software. The use of such software allowed for a second stage of coding 
where themes began to emerge (e.g., additional contributing factors) in conjunction with the 
Hazardous Attitudes themselves. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 and shows the regularity with which the Hazardous Attitudes were found in the 
analyzed accidents. The number represented under “Yes” means the number of accidents in 
which the Hazardous Attitude was found. Conversely, the number under “No” means the number 
of accidents in which the Hazardous Attitude was not found. The top two Hazardous Attitudes 
were Anti-authority and Invulnerability; these two were found in 34 and 25 accidents, 
respectively. In addition, each Hazardous Attitude was further analyzed in fatal accidents. These 
results are demonstrated in Table 3. 
Table 2.
Frequency Count of Hazardous Attitudes in all Accidents 
Hazardous Attitudes Total Accidents
AA IM MA IV RE 
Yes 34 15 9 25 12 
No 3 22 28 12 25 
Totals 37 37 37 37 37 
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Table 3.
Hazardous Attitudes Frequency Count in Fatal Accidents
Hazardous Attitudes in Fatal Accidents
AA IM MA IV RE 
Yes 13 3 3 10 4 
No 1 11 11 4 10 
Totals 14 14 14 14 14 
Relational Analysis Results 
Figure 3 represents a Cluster Analysis performed by NVivo. NVivo can attempt 
relational analyses through a dendogram such as this one. Cluster analyses are good visualization 
tools based on the frequency with which words or coding are shared in the text. This figure 
explores that relationship with word similarity. The dendogram indicates how sources of 
information have word similarities, which in turn could suggest relationships between two 
concepts. The proximity to, and color of codes within the diagram, suggests associations among 
the concepts. 
Anti-authority and Invulnerability share the same color, and are near, to CRM issues. 
This result suggests that these Hazardous Attitudes are similar and are having an impact on the 
ability of crews to perform well together. Both Hazardous Attitudes (i.e., Anti-authority and 
Invulnerability) may lead to the bypassing of procedures and teamwork efforts, which ultimately 
affect CRM. No other relationships between factors and attitudes were established by the 
research team. 
Figure 3. Cluster Analysis between CRM and the predominant Hazardous Attitudes. 
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Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
All of the Hazardous Attitudes were found in the reports analyzed; however, the two 
more dominant ones were Anti-authority and Invulnerability. Anti-authority appeared in 92% of 
the accidents analyzed; meanwhile Invulnerability was found in 68% of the accidents. In 
addition, a relationship between these two Hazardous Attitudes and CRM was clearly established 
by NVivo. Thus, it is unsurprising that both Attitudes were the top two in total and fatal 
accidents. 
As it was evidenced, the Hazardous Attitudes are affecting crew related operations and 
performance. The results of this study, where Anti-authority is the top Hazardous Attitude is 
aligned with Velazquez (2018) where he found Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, 
and Checklists to be the top Behavioral Trap. Also known as Operational Pitfalls, Behavioral 
Traps are accident-inducing attitudes that equally affect decision making (FAA, 2009). In both 
examples of negative behaviors, pilots bypass rules and procedures, fail to follow checklists, 
federal aviation regulations, and manufacturer recommended practices. Moreover, all of these 
studies justify the FAA’s efforts to increase pilot professionalism in the U.S. Part 121 
environment. Perhaps, it is time CRM training include a psychological element in which pilots 
identify and manage behavioral factors such as Hazardous Attitudes. This training can include 
scenarios and Hazardous Attitude modification techniques. 
The FAA could implement more rigorously the NPRM (81 FR 69908-Pilot Professional 
Development, 2016). It is highly recommended that pilots be monitored, mentored, and well 
trained in CRM operations to avoid failures. After all, as Michael Huertas said, “We have some 
of the best pilots in the world and should take full advantage of our pilot’s wealth of experience 
to raise professional standards and cockpit discipline” (FAA, 2016, para 2). Every time pilots 
enter an airline he or she should be briefed on how and why the majority of the accidents have 
occurred. In addition, besides observing the operations inside the cockpit, the pilot should be 
assigned to identify as many hazards as they can. This form of risk management should include 
behavioral hazards. Once the crew is on the ground, all pilots involved should be instructed on 
how to avoid them. 
It will always be almost impossible to reduce human errors to 0% in an environment that 
relies heavily on humans for its operation. However, these studies help identify the shortcomings 
so that all involved can focus on improving safety and accident prevention. 
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